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THE HAND IS INVISIBLE, NATURE KNOWS BEST,
AND JUSTICE IS BLIND: MARKETS, ECOSYSTEMS,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTALISM, AND THE NATURAL
LAW OF SYSTEMS

Bruce Pardy*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The motto "Soit Droit Fait" appears on the crest of the law school where I teach.
Translated, the phrase means "Let Right Be Done." It reflects the instrumentalist's
mantra: law is a means to an end, or a tool for the social good.1 In this essay, I will
argue that legal instrumentalism is inconsistent with the nature of dynamic systems and
in particular ecosystems and markets. The notion of dictating particular ecological or
economic ends conflicts with the natural behavior of these systems and their immutable
rules.
The basic features of ecosystems and markets are not controversial. No one versed
in the ways of these systems would seriously propose to control the population of
butterflies or the price of duct tape. Yet result-oriented measures and practices have
become commonplace, not because the systems are misunderstood but because the role
of law is misconceived. Law is not able to dictate how ecosystems or markets operate.
On the other hand, ecosystems and markets can provide insight about how law
should work. Legal decisions emanate from a system of governance. This system should
operate more like ecosystems and markets than like technicians attempting to fix
problems one at a time. Isolated, instrumentalist legal commands are incompatible with
the operation of law as a system. Providing ad hoc answers on a case-by-case basis is as
much of an affront to legal principles 2 as controlling butterflies is to the nature of an
ecosystem. Instrumentalism is a flawed method by which to govern systems, but
systems can reveal effective ways to approach the legal enterprise.
In this article, I will first make observations about instrumentalism in the context
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Queen's University, Kingston, Canada. I would like to thank
Brian Kolenda for his effective research assistance, and Julie Ashford, Sara Slinn and Alison Josselyn for their
helpful comments. Any errors are my own. Comments are welcome at pardyb@queensu.ca.
1. Brian Z. Tamanaha, How an Instrumental View of Law Corrodes the Rule of Law, 56 DePaul L. Rev.
469, 469 (2007).
2. See id. at 484 ("The U.S. legal system is in imminent danger of becoming less of a system of law....
[T]he rule-bound character of the system is reduced when achieving purposes or focusing on ends becomes the
paramount goal of judges .... [Al legal system requires that judges render decisions according to the
applicable rules, not according to their own political views or preferences.").

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2008

1

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 44 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 5
TULSA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 44:67

of legal theory and then about the nature of ecosystems and markets. On the first topic, I
rely heavily upon the works of Brian Tamanaha 3 and, on the second topic, upon the
commentaries of Jane Jacobs 4 and William Ashworth. 5 I then propose an approach to
the legal governance of ecosystems and markets that is consistent with their
characteristics and reflects a concept of law as a dynamic system.
II.

LEGAL INSTRUMENTALISM

In modem welfare states, instrumentalism abounds. Courts frequently rely on
policy grounds to justify idiosyncratic results in particular cases. Governments develop
policies and programs designed to address a multitude of specific social issues.
Legislatures grant administrative agencies broad mandates with minimal oversight, and
officials act with their own initiative to craft solutions to what they perceive as pressing
community needs. Everywhere state actors take it upon themselves to pursue the ends
they deem appropriate.
Nowhere is the triumph of instrumentalism more apparent than in environmental
law, where the battle between rule-based governance and result-based discretionary
decision-making has more or less been won by instrumentalists. Occasional attempts are
made to identify or articulate abstract principles, 6 but these principles tend to be
malleable and vacuous, providing political and legal decision-makers with more room,
not less, to craft the results that they prefer in any particular situation. Unlike many
other areas of law where conflict between instrumentalism and rule-based adjudication is
not even acknowledged, the campaign against general rules in environmental law has
been explicit on occasion. 7 The case has been made that the nature of environmental8
problems and of ecosystems makes general rules impossible, or at least impractical.

3. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of Law (Cambridge U. Press
2006) [hereinafter Tamanaha, Law as Means to End]; Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Perils of Pervasive Legal
Instrumentalism, (Laurien Talsma & Daphne van Mierlo eds., Wolf Leg. Publishers 2006) [hereinafter
Tamanaha, Perils]; Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge U. Press
2004) [hereinafter Tamanaha, Rule of Law]; Tamanaha, supra n. 1.
4. See Jane Jacobs, The Nature of Economies (Random H. 2000) [hereinafter Jacobs, Nature of
Economies]; Jane Jacobs, Systems of Survival: A Dialogue on the Moral Foundations of Commerce and
Politics(Random H. 1992) [hereinafter Jacobs, Systems of Survival].
5. See William Ashworth, The Economy of Nature: Rethinking the Connections between Ecology and
Economics (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1995).
6. See e.g. Ursula Kettlewell, The Answer to Global Pollution? A CriticalExamination of the Problems
and Potentialof the Polluter-PaysPrinciple,3 Colo. J. Intl. Envtl. L. & Policy 429 (1992); Scott LaFranchi,
Student Author, Surveying the PrecautionaryPrinciple's Ongoing Global Development: The Evolution of an
Emergent Environmental Management Tool, 32 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 679 (2005); J.B. Ruhi, Sustainable
Development: A Five-DimensionalAlgorithm for EnvironmentalLaw, 18 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 31 (1999).
7 A. Dan Tarlock, Is There a There There in Environmental Law? 19 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 213, 219
(2004).
[A]n effective and long-lasting environmental law cannot be constructed around a series of abstract
substantive principles. There is a reason that no Restatement (First) of Environmental Law exists or
is in process. The candidate suite of principles such as advance environmental impact assessment,
polluter pays, precaution, and sustainable development are useful starting points but they can only
serve as guideposts to structure a dynamic, but inevitably ad hoc, decision making processes.
Id. (citing Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan,Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997), afl'd, 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir.
1999)).
8. E.g. J.B. Ruhl, The Pardy-Ruhl Dialogue on Ecosystem Management, Part IV: Narrowing and
Sharpening the Questions, 24 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 25 (2007) [hereinafter Ruh], Pardy-Ruhl Dialogue]; J.B.
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Although command-and-control regulation still exists, it has fallen out of fashion,
condemned as ineffective and futile, and it never really qualified as "rule-based
adjudication" in any event. Ecosystem management has replaced command-and-control
as the dominant methodology in environmental law. This new methodology is a
thoroughly instrumentalist practice that overtly rejects rule of law ideas such as
precedent and the application of general rules. Instead, it claims to address each new
environmental situation as a unique case. 9 An instrumentalist approach to market
governance is more controversial than it is in environmental law, but even in the
economic realm, instrumentalist measures are common. Examples include subsidies for
the building of manufacturing facilities in particular cities or states, government bailouts
for troubled banks, welfare programs to cure poverty, government grant programs to
support particular towns or regions, grants or loans for "family farms," and subsidies for
development of alternative energy technologies.
Instrumentalist law can be legislative, adjudicative, or a combination of both.
Instrumentalist statutes are of two types. They can consist of either specific rules that
apply to particular facts or parties, or vague rules that provide wide discretion to fashion
unique solutions to particular social problems. These two types of legislation seem quite
different-one is specific and non-discretionary, and the other is vague and very
discretionary. However, they are both instrumentalist in nature: the first because the rule
itself is designed to achieve a specific purpose and the second because the statute creates
a regime within which officials have the discretion to determine specific outcomes in
specific situations. The process of applying the latter has the effect of producing the
former-applying a vague, discretionary rule produces a specific rule for a specific
factual circumstance. The outcome is a series of result-oriented, isolated decisions that
lack common principles.
In the realm of adjudication and administration, the instrumentalist's mantra to "do
the right thing" conflicts with the premise of the rule of law that government decisionmakers are not free to do as they think best, "to innovate at pleasure.. . roaming at will
in pursuit of [their] own ideal[s] of beauty or of goodness,"' 10 but are constrained by the
content of the law. Instrumentalism in this context is exactly contrary to the rule of law
since, like beauty, "the right result" lies within the eye of the beholder. The traditional
meaning of the rule of law is a system of governance based upon generally applicable,
abstract rules and limited state discretion, in which the government is subject to the same
law as individual citizens.
Stripped of all technicalities, [the rule of law] means that government in all its [activities]
is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand-rules which make it possible to
foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given

Ruhl, The Myth of What Is Inevitable under Ecosystem Management: A Response to Pardy, 21 Pace Envtl. L.
Rev. 315 (2004) [hereinafter Ruhl, Myth of What Is Inevitable].
9. Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructinga Law of Ecosystem Management, 65 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 293, 303-16 (1994); see also J.B. Ruhl, Ecosystem Management, the ESA, and the Seven
Degrees of Relevance, 14 Nat. Res. & Env. 156 (2000); Rebecca W. Thomson, Ecosystem Management: Great
Idea, but What Is It, Will It Work, and Who Will Pay? 9 Nat. Res. & Env. 42 (1995).
10. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 141 (Yale U. Press 1960) (originally
published in 1921).
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circumstances and to plan one's individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge. I1

Brian Tamanaha explains that these two broad ideas-the rule of law and legal
instrumentalism-presently constitute an uncomfortable dualism in the American legal
system.
The legal tradition in the United States combines two core ideas. The first idea,
known broadly as the rule of law, is that government officials and citizens are obligated to
abide by the regime of legal rules that govern their conduct. The second idea, what I call
legal instrumentalism, is that law is a means to an end or an instrument for the social good.
Both ideas are taken for granted and are equally fundamental in contemporary U.S. legal
culture. It is seldom recognized that the combination of these two ideas is a unique
historical development of relatively
recent provenance and that, in certain crucial respects,
12
they are a mismatched pair.
Both of these ideas have become firmly established as legal norms even though
they directly conflict, at least when applied to courts and other adjudicative bodies.
"Although legal theorists have put forth compelling arguments that rule-bound judging
and a focus on purposes and ends cannot in principlebe combined, this combination has
13
in fact taken place in U.S. legal culture."
These two ideas have both methodological and substantive components. They are
based on different premises about the process of reaching legal decisions and about the
content of the law. I have attempted to summarize the basic distinctions in Figure A
below.

11. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom 72 (U. of Chi. Press 1944) (footnote omitted). Others have
defined the concept more narrowly or broadly. For a comparison of Hayek's view to those of Dicey, Raz,
Rawls, and others, see Michael Neumann, The Rule of Law: Politicizing Ethics 1-22 (Ashgate Publg. Co.
2002).
12. Tamanaha, supra n. 1, at 469.
13. Id. at 489 (emphasis in original).
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Figure A: Instrumentalism and the Rule of Law
Instrumentalism

Rule of Law
Variations:

Methodological
premise

Result-based adjudication
(legal realism,
policy-based reasoning)

Rule-based adjudication
(formalism)
Interpretation,
articulate consistency
(Dworkin)
Variations:

Law consists of

No binding content until
filled by the
decision-maker
(law is essentially empty,
each case on its own facts)

Rules from statutes and
cases (positivism)
Immutable moral
principles and
limitations (natural law)
Principles from statutes
and cases (Dworkin)

The right result

Variations:

Variations:

Greatest benefit and least
burden (utilitarianism)

Required by the rule
(formalism)

Maximum
economic efficiency
(law & economics)

Consistent with the
content of natural law
(natural law)

Greatest social equality
(egalitarianism)

Can be articulately
rationalized as consistent
with principles
(Dworkin)

Etc. (depending on the
group in control)
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MethodologicalPremises

The defining characteristic of adjudicative instrumentalism is result-based
reasoning, the practice of resolving particular cases on the basis of the desirability of the
answer. Where instrumentalist adjudication includes reasons, as in a court decision, it
typically makes generous use of policy grounds and case-specific observations to justify
the decision.14 Instrumentalism promotes adjudication that reflects the judge's personal
perception of right and wrong, and thus submits citizens to coercive control that is
unfettered by democratic accountability. Result-based decisions are highly discretionary
and difficult to challenge or appeal on the grounds of legal error since the basis of the
decision was not primarily application of substantive law in the first place. The school
of thought known as legal realism makes the case that whether or not adjudicative
decision-makers acknowledge participating in result-based reasoning, their decisions will
tend to reflect their own personal predilections, rather than consist of an objective,
derived purely from the application of a rule, as formalism would
neutral result
15
prescribe.
The methodological premise of the rule of law is that decision-makers are the
instruments through which the law is applied 16 but are not the source of the law. 17 The
most literal variation of this approach, formalism, a label that is today often used in a
derisive manner, 18 has come to stand for a rigid, formulaic conception of law in which
legal rules are mechanically applied to facts in order to produce an objective answer.
Formalism is jurisprudence's version of the computer. If the inputs are correct (accurate
facts and the relevant law), then the outputs should follow automatically without the
interjection of the moral preferences of the decision-maker. If adjudication actually
worked this way, then a literal rule of law, free from the personal inclinations of state
officials, would be possible. 19 But formalist theory is susceptible to the criticism that its

14. See e.g. Harrisonv. Carswell, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 200 (Laskin, C.J., dissenting).
15.
The language of judicial decision is mainly the language of logic. And the logical method and form
flatter that longing for certainty and for repose which is in every human mind. But certainty
generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man. Behind the logical form lies a judgment
as to the relative worth and importance of competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and
unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding. You can
give any conclusion a logical form.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 465-66 (1897).
16. "'[C]ourts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing."' Tamanaha, supra n. 1, at 492
(quoting Chief Justice John Marshall in Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. 738, 866 (1824)).
17. F.A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 153 (U. of Chi. Press 1960) ("It is because the lawgiver does
not know the particular cases to which his rules will apply, and it is because the judge who applies them has no
choice in drawing the conclusions that follow from the existing body of rules and the particular facts of the
case, that it can be said that laws and not men rule.").
18. Brian H. Bix, A Dictionaryof Legal Theory 69-70 (Oxford U. Press 2004).
19.
The formal rule of law is complementary to an instrumental view of law when considered in
connection with legislative declarations of law....
When moving from legislation to judging, however, the proposition that judges should strive to
achieve purposes and ends when deciding cases ... raises a direct conflict with the formal rule of
law.
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ideals do not reflect the actual dynamics of legal problem-solving. The difficulty is not
simply that legal officers are seduced by the temptation to reflect their personal
preferences, but that the process of applying general rules to specific facts can produce
inherent ambiguities within which skilled legal practitioners can bob and weave.
Answers in hard cases are not formulaic or automatic but call for interpretation,
reasoning, and argument. However, on the formalists' side, not all cases produce
debilitating ambiguity. Application of a rule to a case that falls within the kind of cases
that the rule was designed to address will often provide straightforward results-results
that a purely instrumentalist approach might disregard in favour of a decision more to the
2
liking of the adjudicator or administrator. 0
Ronald Dworkin's notion of articulate consistency is less mechanical than legal
formalism but more fettered than instrumentalist result-based adjudication. He writes:
[The doctrine of political responsibility] states, in its most general form, that political
officials must make only such political decisions as they can justify within a political
theory that also justifies the other decisions they propose to make. The doctrine seems
innocuous in this general form; but it does, even in this form, condemn a style of political
administration that might be called, following Rawls, intuitionistic. It condemns the
practice of making decisions that seem right in isolation, but cannot be brought within
some comprehensive theory of general principles and policies that is consistent with other
decisions also thought right....
[This] doctrine demands, we might say, articulate consistency.

21

I will return to Dworkin's articulation of legal decision-making in section IV
below.
B.

What Law Consists of

In an ideal instrumentalist universe, there is no independently existing legal
content that binds decision-makers. Such content would constrain them from "doing
right" in each new situation. While instrumentalists do not go so far as to decry the
existence of statutes, it is not difficult to find examples of courts that view statutory
provisions as narrow fetters on their general discretion, unfortunate inconveniences to be
22
disregarded or dismissed when they stand in the way of a proper result.
In a rule of law universe, law has predetermined content not subject to the whims
of the decision-maker. Positivism is the most literal variation. It offers a clean, valuefree, black and white description of what constitutes law: statutes enacted by legislatures,

Tamanaha, supra n. 1, at 485.
20. For example, consider a situation where a poor and desperate father takes a loaf of bread from a large
supermarket chain to feed his hungry children. A judge committed to the formal rule of law would conclude
that the parent has committed theft because his actions fit within the definition. A results-oriented judge would
endeavour to find that no theft has occurred in spite of the definition.
21. Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1064 (1975) (footnote omitted).
22. Tamanaha, supra n. 1, at 503 (quoting the account given by Richard Posner, a "pragmatist" judge, of
his approach to judging: "'The way I approach a case as a judge ... is first to ask myself what would be a
reasonable, sensible result, as a lay person would understand it, and then, having answered that question, to ask
whether that result is blocked by clear constitutional or statutory text, governing precedent, or any other
conventional limitation on judicial discretion."' (citation omitted). Posner appears to believe that his role as a
judge is to do what he thinks is right unless something specifically prevents him from doing so.).
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regulations created pursuant to statutory authority, and common law precedents. For the
positivists, laws are simply commands, and there is no necessary connection between
law and morals. 23 These laws bind courts and administrative officials. No other content
with the force of law exists. Positivism's main methodological difficulty derives from
the inevitable gaps that arise between rules. If there is no other source of law to fill gaps,
then once a gap arises, the decision must be discretionary. 24 Thus, it is possible within a
positivist approach to end up with instrumentalist decisions.
Still under the rule of law umbrella, but in contrast to positivism, is the concept of
natural law. Natural law contains inherent, substantive limits on what legislatures and
judges can do,2 5 a "notion that there are legal limits on law itself, limits derived from
divine law, natural law, principles of reason, or customs descended from time
,26
Natural law is a "higher" law, based upon universal and immutable
immemorial."
moral principles, and its purpose is to reflect what is good for human beings. 2 ' The
earliest formulations of natural law theory tended to link reason with some notion of a
deity 28 and thus tended to be influenced by theology. Contemporary revival of natural
law ideas reflect a wide spectrum of content, from Fuller's eight minimum procedural
3
0
requirements 29 to Finnis's seven human goods or basic forms of human flourishing.
The main difficulty with the concept of natural law is that it calls upon the state to
enforce particular views about morality and goodness. The idea that there are inherent
moral limitations on the power of legislatures or judges is burdened by the subjectivity of
moral preferences and the diversity of views within a pluralistic society, which makes
the proposition of immutable natural law difficult to maintain. 3 1 One can see the
subjectivity of those preferences simply by observing the wide variation between the
23. David Dyzenhaus, The Rule of Law as the Rule of Liberal Principle,in Ronald Dworkin 56, 57 (Arthur
Ripstein ed., Cambridge U. Press 2007); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
Harv. L. Rev. 593, 594, 602-03 (1958).
24. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 17 (Harv. U. Press 1977).
25. Tamanaha, supra n. 1, at 474-75 (quoting Thomas Aquinas who stated that "'[e]very human positive
law has the nature of law to the extent that it is derived from the Natural law. If, however, in some point it
conflicts with the law of nature it will no longer be law but rather a perversion of law."' (citation omitted)).
26. Id. at 474 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
27. Raymond Wacks, Philosophy of Law: A Very Short Introduction 15 (Oxford U. Press 2006).
28. Ian McLeod, Legal Theory 55 (Marise Cremona ed., 3d ed., Palgrave Macmillan 2005).
29. Generality, promulgation, non-retroactivity, clarity, non-contradiction, requiring the possible, constancy
through time, and congruence between official action and declared rule. Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law
39-94 (Yale U. Press 1964).
What I have tried to do is to discern and articulate the natural laws of a particular kind of human
undertaking, which I have described as "the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the
governance of rules."

What I have called the internal morality of law is... a procedural version of natural law ....
Id. at 96.
30. Life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability, practical reasonableness, and "religion." John
Finnis, Natural Law and NaturalRights 85-90 (Clarendon Press 1980).
3 1. See Tamanaha, Law as Means to End, supra n. 3, at 131 (quoting Alasdair Maclntyre, Theories of
Natural Law in the Culture of Advanced Modernity, in Common Truths: New Perspectives on NaturalLaw 91,
93 (Edward B. McLean ed., ISI Books 2000) ("'[N]o fact seems to be plainer in the modem world than the
extent and depth of moral disagreement, often enough disagreement on basic issues."'); Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Natural Law, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 42 (1918) ("[T]o those who agree with me I am uttering
commonplaces and to those who disagree I am ignoring the necessary foundations of thought.").
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content of natural law proposed by Fuller and that proposed by Finnis.
Natural law and instrumentalism start in opposite corners, the former proposing
that law has inherent content that limits the actions of state officials and the latter
denying that it does or that it should. However, their abstract goals are strangely similar
in that both purport to give legal force to subjective preferences. These preferences are
found either within the particular version of "natural law" being professed as natural or
within the instrumentalist priorities of officials crafting solutions.
C.

The Right Result

Through instrumentalist eyes, law is merely a tool. It has no inherent content of its
own. It is bereft of internal sensibility, an empty vessel that can be filled by whoever is
politically or legally powerful enough to fill it. The "right result" depends on who has
the reins.
Utilitarianism, a dominant variation of instrumentalist philosophy, is an ethical or
jurisprudential theory that identifies social utility as the objective of law and social
action. 32 It often manifests as a rough calculus of benefit and burden assessed at a
community level. Utilitarianism can be adapted to serve a variety of interests, as benefit
and burden may be defined at will. Groups with vastly different agendas can claim to be
utilitarian, defining and redefining the proper result in accordance with their own
interests and predilections, sacrificing the rights of the individual in favour of a vague
notion of the collective good. Policy considerations tend to be offered as rationales to
legitimize arbitrary preferences, 33 masking the subjectivity and moral relativism inherent
in the utilitarian inquiry.
Other variations of the "right" result-such as economic efficiency, egalitarian
distribution, socially conservative values, and preservation of life-vary with the
prevailing belief about what is good and desirable. Stripped to its core, instrumentalism
is not much more than an unfettered power to coerce. As Brian Tamanaha describes,
Fundamental disputes exist over what social justice requires, the proper trade-offs between
liberty and equality or between formal and substantive equality, the enforcement of moral
and religious norms in the public and private spheres, the rights of women, minorities, and
gays and lesbians, the appropriate distribution of resources and opportunities, conditions of
employment, the balance between economic development and harm to the environment,
and so on. The old faith that the sciences will supply answers to these questions now
smacks of naivet&-the natural and social sciences are themselves caught up in the battles
among groups, with contrary studies enlisted to serve all sides....
These attitudes fuel the militant "groupism" that is a standout feature of contemporary
discourse....
All of these groups confront one another in various legal arenas-in cause litigation, in
legislative and administrative lobbying, and in battles over judicial appointments-and

32. Bix, supran. 18, at 214.

33. "[I]t is fair to surmise that a greater proportion of contemporary judges are judicial pragmatists ....
Judicial decisions today routinely cite policy considerations, consider the purposes behind the law, and pay
attention to law's social consequences." Tamanaha, supra n. 1,at 490.
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34
routinely claim to be acting in the name of the public good.

D.

Summary: The Problem

In the absence of natural law, law is a vacuum. It can be filled by whatever
interest manages to gain access to state power to achieve particular ends. The alternative
is to prescribe predetermined legal content that reflects an "objective" truth about what is
good, desirable, right, and proper-but that proposition is a fiction. It would entrench a
particular view about what is good that, in a pluralist society, cannot reflect the
predilections of all members of the community to which it is applied.
What is the alternative? What approach can protect against arbitrary exercise of
state power used to pursue particular ends, be they evil or benevolent, and avoid the
imposition of one group's priorities over others? Are there principles that are natural,
unassailable, objectively true, and independent of human preference?
III.

ECOSYSTEMS AND MARKETS

It is no revelation that ecosystems and markets are both dynamic systems or that
they share important features. 35 These systems are not just collections of things, like
widgets or frogs, but consist of elements interacting in a complex web of relationships
and patterns 3 6 that together amount to phenomena different than the sum of their parts.
They contain mechanisms that express and process information and produce patterns and
outcomes. Some elements have a physical form, such as widgets and frogs, but many do
not, such as a sale of goods. The goods may have a physical form, but the transaction
37
itself does not.
These systems operate according to their own immutable characteristics and rules.
They are organic and evolutionary, changing through time, rather than existing in a fixed
or static state. They arise spontaneously and are neither created nor destroyed by the
actions of individual people or agencies. However, their operations can be perverted
when their characteristics and principles are not respected. Below are brief descriptions
of some of these characteristics and principles. This list is by no means exhaustive, and
sketches of this length hardly do these features justice, but they illustrate the forces at

34. Id. at 481-82.
35. "[T]he laws of ecology and the laws of economics are, at heart, the same set of laws." Ashworth, supra
n. 5, at 205 (emphasis omitted). "Today, the study of competitive dynamics is standard fare in business
schools. But, ironically, the professors never mention that nature has been playing by the same rules for eons."
Michael Rothschild, Economy as Ecosystem, in The Libertarian Reader: Classic and Contemporary Readings
from Lao-tzu to Milton Friedman243, 247 (David Boaz ed., Free Press 1997).
36.
Every organism is defined by the information in its genes, but a living thing also is defined by its
relationships to its prey, competitors, and predators. In the same way, an organization is defined by
its technology and by its associations with its suppliers, competitors, and customers. From a
bionomic perspective, organisms and organizations are nodes in networks of relationships. As time
passes and evolution proceeds, some nodes are wiped out and new ones crop up, triggering
adjustments that ripple across each network. Constrained by its key relationships, each organism
and each organization is held in its niche, pursuing the same goal--the survival of the genetic or
technological information it carries.
Rothschild, supra n. 35, at 243.
37. A written contract may provide evidence of the exchange but does not constitute the exchange itself.
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work that make ecosystems and markets dynamic, self-governing entities.
A.

Scarcity

In ecosystems and markets, resources are scarce. 38 Scarcity is the state in which
the supply of a resource is insufficient to meet all the demand for it.3 9 For example, in
an ecosystem, the population of organisms is limited by the availability of food. Scarcity
does not mean that the supply of food is inadequate to maintain organisms within the
system. Instead, it means that the supply of food limits the population to what it is at any
given moment in time. In a market, purchasers seek to avoid scarcity by obtaining the
resources that they desire, and producers and sellers seek to respond to scarcity, meeting
demand at the highest possible price. Scarcity drives the dynamics of supply and
demand in both ecosystems and markets.
B.

Supply and Demand
In a sense, a market is the relationship between supply and demand.
What economists call the law of supply states merely that, all other things being equal, as
the price of something rises, suppliers will supply more of it. The law of demand is similar
markets do-all they
but reversed: as the price rises, consumers will demand less. All
40
do--is establish a balance between these two opposing tendencies.

The relationship between supply and demand determines how much of a good will be
produced, how much will be sold, and at what price.
Supply and demand is also a fundamental characteristic of ecosystems. Resources
are not bought and sold, of course, but the relationship between supply and demand (or
between availability and need, to use non-economic terms) creates the conditions for
competition and adaptation of individual organisms and for the evolution of species.
When seeds are plentiful and the demand for seeds from seed-eating birds is modest,
meaning the demand is within the supply, then competition for seeds is minimal. There
is room for the population of seed-eating birds to grow, and the pressure to adapt and
evolve is minimal. The situation is reversed when the demand for seeds exceeds the
supply, resulting in acute competition for seeds and downward pressure on population.
In this situation, conditions exist for adaptation to eating some other food source.
C.

Autonomous Individuals

Supply and demand are aggregate phenomena borne of individual action. A
multitude of sellers and buyers make their own self-interested choices about what to sell
and buy and at what price. A market expresses collective conclusions without collective
decision-making. This is Adam Smith's "invisible hand" in action. 4 1 The individual
38. Ashworth, supra n. 5, at 98-99.
39. Id. at 98.
40. Id. at 116 (emphasis in original). "The great nineteenth-century British essayist and skeptic Thomas
Carlyle was once said to have remarked to a friend that the best way to train an economist was to purchase a
parrot and teach it to repeat the phrase supply and demand over and over." Id. at 115 (emphasis in original).
41.
Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most advantageous employment
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quest for survival plays a similar role in ecosystems. The system's relationships and
patterns result from the actions of individual organisms. The central importance of the
individual in both systems does not deny the existence of communities, whether social or
organic, but community arises from the aggregate behaviour of individuals. Without
autonomous individuals, ecosystems and markets do not exist.
D.

Pursuitof Self-Interest

Each of the autonomous individuals within markets and ecosystems is engaged in
the pursuit of self-interest, which produces both competition and cooperation with other
individuals. 42 In markets, genuine competition means that no single enterprise can
control supply, demand, or price. It requires many buyers and sellers for each good and
service, access to accurate information, low transaction costs, low barriers to entry, and
43
the absence of government subsidization, which falsifies costs and prices.
Concentration of market power interferes with competition because each transaction
does not reflect a negotiated bargain but rather reflects the resolve of the party with the
power to dictate price, for example, by restricting supply. The information provided by
such transactions is false 44 because it does not reflect the relationship between supply,
demand, and price that would exist if many buyers and sellers operated in the market for
that good or service. Competition in ecosystems operates similarly as the engine of
adaptation and evolution. As in markets, ecosystem competition is skewed by
monopolistic forces 45 because they render false information. Success no longer depends
on competition and adaptation but on system dominance, which allows the monopolist to
determine outcomes. In modem ecosystems, the monopolists are human beings.
E.

Survival of the Fittest:Adaptation, Specialization,Efficiency

Competition between autonomous individuals for scarce resources leads to
adaptation 46 through technological and commercial innovation within markets and
behavioural and genetic evolution in ecosystems. As Michael Rothschild explains,
[i]n both ecosystem and economy, survival rewards efficiency.

Inefficiency is

for whatever capital he can command. It is his own advantage, indeed, and not that of the society,
which he has in view. But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily leads him
to prefer that employment which is most advantageous to the society.

[H]e intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to
promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it
was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more
effectually than when he really intends to promote it.
Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations vol. 1, 453, 456 (6th ed., George
Bell & Sons 1887).
42. For example, in ecosystems organisms may exist in a symbiotic relationship; and in markets, people
pool capital to pursue common economic goals. In a market, even people who hate each other have cause to
cooperate when it is in their self-interest to do so.
43. Jacobs, Nature of Economies, supra n. 4, at 11l; Joseph E. Stiglitz & Carl E. Walsh, Principles of
Microeconomics 27-30 (Jack Repcheck, ed., 4th ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 2006).
44. Ashworth, supra n. 5, at 112; Jacobs, Nature of Economies, supra n. 4, at 108.
45. Jacobs, Nature of Economies, supran. 4, at 35.
46. Id.
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punished by extinction. Attempting to escape scarcity, species as well as industries
fragment into ever more-specialized offshoots. By adapting to the peculiarities of their
niches, ecologic and economic life forms become more efficient at making offspring and
products. Lacking any grand design other than the urge to escape threats to their continued
existence, genes and technology spontaneously weave living webs of ever more-intricate
filigree. The future details of these stunningly complex systems are47unknowable, but their
similar.
basic architecture and historical direction are quite clear and
Sometimes adaptations follow a gradual pattern of progression from an existing
state. In a market, an enterprise may expand a product line or pursue sales in a new
territory. Human evolution has seen a gradual increase in brain size and loss of body
48
An enterprise
hair. Sometimes imminent failure can require radical adaptation.
producing canoes at a greater cost than their market price faces collapse unless it takes
the road less travelled and develops a new product line-kayaks perhaps, instead of
canoes. However, if kayaks do not bring profits either, the business may be forced to
develop unrelated products or services, utilize new skills, adopt other modes of
production, hire different employees, or move to other locations. In ecosystems,
evolutionary adaptations can produce radically new structures or survival strategies.
49
the
Jacobs describes two examples of developments that fit into this category:
emergence of multi-celled organisms from a population of single-celled creatures and,
much later, the emergence of air-breathing vertebrates from an ancestry of marine
vertebrates. Such adaptations arise spontaneously as a survival response to system
conditions.
F.

Diversificationand Resilience

Competition leads to increased efficiency and specialization for individual
organisms and enterprises, which in turn increases diversity and resilience in the system.
Diversity is a measure of variety. For example, a market contains a diversity of skills,
services, goods, capital, and modes of production and transportation. Likewise in each
more. 50
ecosystem, there is a diversity of species, genes, nutrients, habitats, and
Resilience is a measure of a system's ability to maintain its relationships in the face of
disturbances. 5 1 Diversity generally enhances resilience because it makes the system less
susceptible to disruption or failure of one or more of its elements. In an ecosystem, the
decline of a dominant species because of a sudden or catastrophic event could
significantly alter the nature of the ecosystem, unless the system is diverse to the extent
that the decline of one species is mitigated by the presence of others occupying the same

47. Rothschild, supra n. 35, at 246.
48. Jacobs, Nature of Economies, supra n.4, at 87.
49. Id.
50. Paulo A.L.D. Nunes, Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh & Peter Nijkamp, The Ecological Economics of
Biodiversity: Methods and Policy Applications 9-13 (Edward Elgar PubIg. 2003) (explaining the important
distinction between different levels of biodiversity (e.g. gene diversity, species diversity, ecosystem diversity,
functional diversity)).
51. In ecology, this term has come to refer to both "the magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed" and
speed of an ecosystem's return to equilibrium "without flipping the current ecosystem to another regime of
behavior." Id. at 12 (citations omitted). See also C.S. Holling, Resilience and Stability of EcologicalSystems,
4 Annual Rev. Ecology & Systematics 1, 14 (1973).
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or similar niches. In a diverse market, the failure of one mode of food production is
evolutionary rather than catastrophic if there are other modes also in operation.
Individual efficiency and specialization is not the same as system efficiency.
Competition rewards the former, but the latter is not the measure of diversity or
52
resilience.
G.

FailureIs a Necessary Event

Competition leads to winners and losers. Failure is as normal and necessary as
success. Unlike the meaning of failure in social contexts, failure in ecosystems and
markets carries no moral judgment. It is merely one of the possible conclusions for
individual strategies in a particular system context. All organisms die, and every
species' survival strategy includes eventual failure for its individual members. In
markets, not all enterprises die, but failure in the form of bankruptcy or other termination
is the appropriate destiny for unsuccessful commercial strategies.
Failure provides at least three essential functions. First, it produces information for
a system's patterns and feedback mechanisms. For example, a declining population of
prey fuels positive and negative feedback loops (see (h) below) and excess inventory
directs future resource allocation and production. Second, failure provides food and/or
raw materials for the organisms and enterprises that are still alive. 53 For example,
rotting logs provide habitats for animals and insects and the useless assets of bankrupt
corporations become useful assets of new entrepreneurs. Third, failure opens up
opportunities and niches to be filled by other organisms and entrepreneurs. Economies,
like nature, abhor vacuums. 54 Each vacancy created by the demise of an organism or an
enterprise is an opportunity to be taken up by other, better-adapted competitors.
H.

Dynamic Stability and Self-CorrectingMechanisms

Dynamic stability means active avoidance of collapse. 55 While failures of
organisms and enterprises are necessary events, failure of the system itself is not.
Operating within these systems are at least two kinds of mechanisms or responses that
act to avoid or minimize instability and collapse, and to enable adaptation to new
conditions. Positive feedback is "the enhanc[ement] or amplification of an effect by its
own influence on the process which gives rise to it." 56 In ecosystems, for example,
positive feedback loops exist where there is growth; they are the mechanisms that
produce biomass expansion. Plants transform the sun's energy through photosynthesis
into matter consumed by plant-eating animals, which helps to fertilize the soil, which
feeds increased plant growth, which produces more available food for other herbivores,

52. See Thomas Homer-Dixon, The Upside of Down: Catastrophe, Creativity, and the Renewal of
Civilization 229-33 (Is. Press 2006); Jacobs, Nature of Economies, supra n. 4, at 108.
53. Jacobs, Nature of Economies, supran. 4, at 89-90.
54. See id.
at 117.
55. Id. at 84; Holling, supra n. 51, at 14 ("[S]tability... represents the ability of a system to return to an
equilibrium state after a temporary disturbance; the more rapidly it returns and the less it fluctuates, the more
stable it would be.").
56. The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English 1066 (Della Thompson ed., 9th ed., Clarendon Press
1995).
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which leads to more fertilization. In markets, positive feedback is a common
phenomenon reflecting the basic principle that economic activity begets more economic
activity. An enterprise imports raw materials, combines them with labour and
technology to produce exports, pays its labourers and suppliers who purchase goods and
services, including imports, from other suppliers, and then purchases more imports with
profits from its exports with which it makes more exports and so on. 57 Positive feedback
58
can be thought of as a self-fueling process.
Negative feedback is the reverse: "the diminution or counteraction of an effect by
its own influence on the process giving rise to it." 59 In ecosystems, the relationship
between predator and prey often acts as a negative feedback loop. The more wolves
there are, the more rabbits that are eaten; the more rabbits that are eaten, the harder it is
to find rabbits; the fewer rabbits there are, the fewer wolves who can survive; the fewer
wolves there are, the fewer predators looking for rabbits; the fewer rabbits that are eaten,
the more rabbits there are to reproduce; and so on. In markets, the supply and demand
relationship provides negative feedback to limit incorrect allocation of resources. If too
many enterprises produce more apples than there are customers who wish to buy them,
price will decline, eventually to a level lower than apples cost to produce. Some
enterprises will either stop producing apples and shift to something else or go out of
business. As the number of producers falls, the supply of apples in the market decreases.
As supply decreases, the price rises. And so on.
I.

Non-LinearSystems in Non-Equilibrium

Ecosystems and markets are evolutionary, not revolutionary. They exist in a state
of non-equilibrium 60 and never reach a fixed or fully evolved state, but are in a continual
process of change. For some of these systems, the rate of change is rapid; for others, it
may be very slow. Their destinies are not shaped in a particular moment, but change by
virtue of the effects of an infinite number of interactions and relationships through time.
They are non-linear and unpredictable. 6 1 Even if every single influence could be taken
into account, their futures would still be unknown. 62 Everything is connected to
everything else,63 and it is not possible to isolate an element in order to understand its
behaviour separate from the many other forces and events to which it is attached.

57. Jacobs, Nature of Economies, supra n. 4, at 94.
58. Id. at 95.
59. The Concise Oxford Dictionaryof CurrentEnglish, supra n. 56, at 911.
60. A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of
EnvironmentalLaw, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1121 (1994).
61. Jacobs, Nature of Economies, supran. 4, at 137.
62. Id.
63. Barry Commoner, The Closing Circle: Nature, Man, and Technology 33 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1971).
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Summary: Order without Direction,64 Development without Decree

Markets and ecosystems run themselves. Their fundamental rules have not been
created or invented by human beings, and cannot be changed by government design.
The "invisible hand" guides the market; the expression "nature knows best" reflects the
operation of ecosystems. All participants are equally subject to their forces; systems do
not play favourites. 65 Governments may impose taxes, restrict supplies, or subsidize
production but cannot eliminate the relationship between supply, demand, and the price
for a particular good. Regulation can attempt to control water use, movement, and
treatment but cannot change the nature of the water cycle. Human action can affect the
outcome of system processes, but it cannot change the nature of those processes.
The existence of these immutable system features does not mean that there cannot
or should not be laws that apply to markets and ecosystems. On the contrary, ecosystems
and markets need laws to protect them from forces that might otherwise interfere with
and distort their operation. Calling these systems "immutable" does not mean that they
are impervious to external forces, but only that their internal principles are independent
of state regulation, moral argument, or personal preference. They cannot be manipulated
to behave as something other than systems. Therefore, legal rules and principles need to
account for the manner in which they operate.
IV.

THE LAW OF SYSTEMS-A NEW NATURAL LAW

An instrumentalist approach to ecosystems and markets conflicts with the nature of
these systems because it prescribes ends. Fashioning the "right" results in particular
situations or responding to specific social, economic, or environmental problems is not
an appropriate objective because a focus on results is anathema to the operation of
systems. Instrumentalist practices govern systems as though they are not systems at all
by attempting to control, manage, and dictate outcomes.
The alternative is to establish and enforce general rules and principles that protect
ecosystems and markets from undue influence, so that these systems may operate
according to their inherent characteristics and thereby create their own ends. Like
traditional conceptions of natural law, a "natural law of systems" restricts the powers of
the state by setting limits on what the law can do. However, it rests on a different
premise than the old natural law, which through time has been based upon a variety of
customs, moral judgments, and procedural or behavioural norms, each of which reflects a
particular subjective view of what is good. A natural law of systems reflects the

64. In his introduction to Michael Rothchild's Economy as Ecosystem in The Libertarian Reader, supra n.
35, at 243, David Boaz states that the economist William A. Niskanen, former member of the President's
Council of Economic Advisors and Chairman of the Cato Institute, has three portraits on his wall, one of Isaac
Newton, one of Adam Smith, and one of Charles Darwin, and underneath each portrait is the inscription "Order
without Direction."
65.
It is significant that one of the commonest objections to competition is that it is "blind." It is not
irrelevant to recall that to the ancients blindness was an attribute of their deity of justice. Although
competition and justice may have little else in common, it is as much a commendation of
competition as of justice that it is no respecter of persons.
Hayek, supra n. 11, at 101.
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immutable characteristics of dynamic systems rather than moral preferences and
provides a structure for defining the boundaries of law and the liberties of individuals.
A natural law of systems consists of rules and principles that protect the features
and characteristics of markets and ecosystems. While markets and ecosystems have their
66
own intrinsic principles and characteristics, they require human laws to protect them.
Without such laws, markets and ecosystems are vulnerable to corruption by forces
inconsistent with their operation. For law to do this job, it too must operate as a system.
Like ecosystems and markets, it must be internally coherent. Every rule and principle
should be connected. Every decision should be related to all others. Within a properly
constituted legal system, there is an answer for every problem that arises. Such a system
treats its participants dispassionately and equally, subjecting all to the same rules;
systems do not play favorites nor take account of special circumstances.
Market-ProtectingLaws

A.

67

Without laws to protect them, markets can become dysfunctional. In The Wealth
of Nations, Adam Smith wrote:
Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state which does not enjoy a
regular administration of justice, in which the people do not feel themselves secure in the
possession of their property, in which the faith of contracts is not supported by law, and in
enforcing the
which the authority of the state is not supposed to be
68 regularly employed in
payment of debts from all those who are able to pay.
In the absence of a legal regime designed in accordance with the operation of
markets, commercial transactions could be replaced by other kinds of struggle such as
the exercise of physical force. A peaceful market exists where there is government with
power to enforce rules against physical conflict, breach of contractual promises, and
concentration of market power. Such rules allow markets to function by defining the
conditions under which all transactions will take place. Neither laissez-faire economics
nor economic subsidies are consistent with this approach. The former does not establish
the conditions that ensure peaceful, competitive markets, and the latter directly interfere
with their operation.
A legal rule or principle designed to protect markets must be generally applicable.
Prohibitions on physical force, breaching contracts, monopolistic power, and the use of
child labour are all of this kind. A specific rule that applies only to a particular kind of
66.
The liberal argument is ... based on the conviction that, where effective competition can
be created, it is a better way of guiding individual efforts than any other. It does not
deny, but even emphasizes, that, in order that competition should work beneficially, a
carefully thought-out legal framework is required and that neither the existing nor the
past legal rules are free from grave defects. Nor does it deny that, where it is impossible
to create the conditions necessary to make competition effective, we must resort to other
methods of guiding economic activity. ... And it regards competition as superior not
only because it is in most circumstances the most efficient method known but even more
because it is the only method by which our activities can be adjusted to each other
without coercive or arbitrary intervention of authority.
id. at 36.
67. Parts of this section are adapted from Bruce Pardy, Regulatory Creep Revisited, 1998 N.Z. L.J. 352.
68. Smith, supra n. 41, at 449.
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transaction or activity distorts the market's signals and mechanisms. When generally
applicable rules exist and there is perfect competition within the market, Adam Smith's
"invisible hand" operates-the market determines supply, demand, and price; resources
are allocated in accordance with their highest value uses, and the system's mechanisms
operate. Market competition can occur in an economy to which many laws apply, while
competition will be skewed in a lightly regulated economy if the regulations are not
generally applicable. The market's function does not depend on whether there are many
or few generally applicable rules because they apply to all of the actors in the economy;
therefore, none of those persons are placed at a competitive disadvantage. All bargainers
are subject to the same restraints.
Market-protecting laws may have distributive effects if they do so across the
market. They may affect the bargaining power of parties in a particular transaction
relative to each other but not the bargaining power of the parties relative to their
competitors. For example, a rule providing for a minimum wage will affect the bargain
reached between a company and an unskilled worker. In the absence of the minimum
wage law, the worker might have accepted less pay than the level of the minimum wage.
The content of their bargain has been influenced by the rule. However, what has not
changed is their bargaining position relative to their competitors' bargaining position.
There is no change to what each party can offer the other, relative to other parties with
whom they could decide to contract instead. All companies are subject to the minimum
wage law. Therefore, the law places no enterprise 69 at a competitive advantage or
disadvantage. Similarly, none of the worker's competitors are able to offer their labour
to the company for less than the minimum wage in an attempt to be more competitive.
Whether the worker is paid minimum wage or some amount above minimum wage will
depend upon the aggregate of the market transactions for unskilled labour. The existence
of the rule does affect the bargains reached, but even in the presence of the rule, the
"invisible hand" of the market operates to determine the final price for labour and the
number ofjobs available.
Laws distort a market when they interfere with particular transactions, particular
kinds of transactions, the supply of particular kinds of goods, or a particular class of
traders. They change particular outcomes rather than the community rules about entering
into transactions, and they upset the relative competitiveness of the players by forcing
some players to tolerate restrictions or obligations that their competitors do not have or
by creating advantages that not all competitors enjoy. A minimum wage law that
distinguishes between waged employees and independent contractors, making one group
subject to the rule and the other not, distorts the market. Since both groups sell their
labour, such a rule does not treat all transactions for the sale of labour in the same way.
Instead, it shifts the purchase of labour towards independent contractors and away from
employees. Government subsidies for nuclear electricity mean that the nuclear industry
does not do business under the same conditions as the suppliers of other forms of energy.
Rules that stipulate that particular goods are to be sold only by a particular party, such as
a marketing board, virtually eliminate the market by designating a single seller. In
markets, failure is a necessary event. Laws that attempt to protect enterprises from
69. Except foreign firms.
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economic termination skew the market's mechanisms.
B.

Ecosystem-ProtectingLaws

Ecosystems also need legal rules and principles to protect them. While human
beings were, at one time, merely one species among many within ecosystems, human
activity now dominates the landscape. Markets and ecosystems are inextricably
linked. 70 Pursuit of self-interest is a key component of both markets (competing buyers
and sellers) and ecosystems (competing organisms), but the competition of buyers and
sellers within markets can cause harm to ecosystems. One of the functions of ecosystemprotecting laws is to protect ecosystems against encroachment from market activities.
Ecosystems provide the platform of "ecosystem services ' '7 1 on which markets rest and
human beings rely for survival and economic exchange: air and water purification, soil
generation, climate stabilization, photosynthesis, pollination, waste decomposition, and
so on. These services are rarely in a concrete form that can be owned, and therefore they
do not constitute goods and services within markets. Consequently, they cannot be
bought and sold, and there is no private incentive to produce or conserve them. The
72
absence of property rights in ecosystem services renders them common resources,
owned by no one, and therefore susceptible to "the tragedy of the commons," 73 leading
to overuse and eventual depletion or destruction.
Like laws for markets, ecosystem-protecting laws are generally applicable and
shield system functions from interference. Neither an environmental free-for-all nor
particularized management is consistent with this approach. The former does not protect
ecosystems from human excess, and the latter attempts to intervene in their operation.
The legal challenge is to identify, in abstract terms, when human impact has exceeded
the limits that an ecosystem's self-governing mechanisms can tolerate without altering
the ecosystem's developmental path. Cut down a few trees here and there, and no
permanent change occurs to the forest. Clear-cut a hundred acres and the ecosystem is
fundamentally altered. Drawing an environmental line in the sand is conceptually
74
Human beings play a
difficult. How much impact upon an ecosystem is too much?

70. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Law and Three Economies: Navigatinga Sprawling Field of
Study, Practice, and Societal Governance in Which Everything Is Connected to Everything Else, 23 Harv.
Envtl. L. Rev. 359 (1999).
71. See generally J.B. Ruhl, Steven E. Kraft & Christopher L. Lant, The Law and Policy of Ecosystem
Services (Is. Press 2007); Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services and Natural
Capital, 387 Nat. 253 (1997); J.B. Ruhl, Presentation, Toward a Common Law of Ecosystem Services (St.
Thomas U. Sch. L., Minneapolis, Minn., Oct. 6, 2005), in 18 St. Thomas L. Rev. 1 (2005); J.B. Ruhl, Equitable
Apportionment of Ecosystem Services: New Water Lawfor a New Water Age, 19 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 47
(2003).
72. Ruhl et al., The Law and Policy ofEcosystem Services, supra n. 71, at 10.
73. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968).
74. Other issues arise as well. Upon which ecosystem is the impact to be assessed? Are the ecosystems to
be protected the ones that now exist even if they have already been altered by human activity, or the ones that
are thought to have existed in the past, prior to human disturbance? I address these and other issues in
developing a generally-applicable environmental limit in Bruce Pardy, In Search of the Holy Grail of
Environmental Law: A Rule to Solve the Problem, 1 McGill Intl. J. Sustainable Dev. L. & Policy 29 (2005).
For an alternative reformulation of environmental law, see Michael M'Gonigle & Paula Ramsay, Greening
Environmental Law: From Sectoral Reform to Systemic Re-Formation, 14 J. Envtl. L. & Prac. 333 (2004).
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dual role in ecosystems. 75 On the one hand, they are elements like any other, and their
animal-like actions within the system are conceptually no different than those of deer,
warthogs, or termites when they feed, breathe, and die. As in markets, each of these
participants pursues its own survival and self-interest, and the system expresses the
results of their successes and failures. But also as in markets, monopolies impede
competition in ecosystems. If human beings overrun the environmental game, then the
game is no longer being played according to its rules. As I have stated elsewhere,
Human beings are part of nature when they are the ecological equivalent of one of the
many competitive buyers and sellers in a perfectly competitive marketplace. Human
beings are part of nature when they exist within an ecosystem as one of many perfectly
competitive species; when they exert impact that, while it may contribute to the
interactions in the system and thus influence the nature of the change that the ecosystem
experiences, is not disproportionate to the impact exerted by other species in the system.
That is, where humans are just one of the many elements in a system and through their
participation as one of the elements, contribute to the evolution of the system (that is, the
nonequilibrium of the system) then humans are part of nature and the change is natural.
When any organism eats, breathes, dies and decays, those activities produce impacts on the
system that are natural, whether the organism is a flower, tree frog or human. However,
when humans exert a disproportionate influence on the state of a system, like a monopoly
in a marketplace, they are not part of nature, but stand outside it. Their role is unlike that
of any other organism. Under these conditions, the changes experienced by the system are
"invisible hand" of system interactions, but are wrought by one of its
not guided by the
76
elements alone.
These disproportionate human effects may be benevolent or evil, careful or
careless, managed or mismanaged, or centrally-planned or laissez-faire. Regardless of
origin or intent, they exceed the system's ability to maintain its character and
evolutionary path in the presence of disturbance. The purpose of ecosystem-protecting
laws is to identify and prohibit such effects with rules and principles that apply generally
to human activities in all ecosystems.
Generally applicable rules are notoriously absent in modem environmental law.
As many have observed, environmental law has substantially influenced other,
established areas of law such as administrative law, international law, property, torts, and
water law as well as more remote subjects such as corporations, securities regulation, and
intellectual property. However, when one sums up the cases, statutes, and administrative
regulations that make up the core of what most people consider environmental law, one is
hard pressed to reduce them to a set of distinctive, fundamental principles, let alone rules
that can be appolied to a wide range of current and future issues, as one can do in other areas
of "real law."//

75. Oliver A. Houck, Lecture, Are Humans Part of Ecosystems? (Nw. Sch. L. Lewis & Clark College,
Portland, Or., Sept. 11, 1997), in 28 Envtl. L. 1 (1998).
76. Bruce Pardy, Changing Nature: The Myth of the Inevitability of Ecosystem Management, 20 Pace Envtl.
L. Rev. 675, 684-85 (2003).
77. Tarlock, supra n. 7, at 217-18 (footnotes omitted). Nor is modem environmental law truly ecosystem

based.
Instead, environmental protection laws focus on narrower things, such as human health, air, water,
forests, wetlands, wildlife habitat, and so on. Separate regimes regulate these various subjects,
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The philosophy of ecosystem management has come to dominate environmental
governance, sometimes explicitly, and sometimes in the absence of a formal declaration
or specific statutory regime. Ecosystem management is an approach to environmental
governance whose purpose is to measure, control, and change ecosystems to produce the
most desirable environment in human terms. 78 One of the main tools of ecosystem
management is "[adaptive management,] . . . a methodology that relies on building
models of ecosystem dynamics and then us[es] rigorous testing, monitoring, and
evaluation of policy implementations to provide the feedback necessary to promote longterm ecosystem integrity."

79

Adaptive ecosystem management purports to protect

ecosystem function, but it is a distinctly instrumentalist practice consisting of isolated,
targeted decisions made for particular and varied purposes.

A recent report by the

National Academy of Science's research arm, the National Research Council, in an

investigation into the Missouri River ecosystem, stated:
The concept of adaptive management promotes the notion that management policies should
be flexible and should incorporate new information as it becomes available. New
management actions should build upon the results of previous experiments in an iterative
process. It stresses the continuous use of scientific information and monitoring to help
policies change appropriately to achieve specific environmental and
organizations and
80
objectives.
social

The pursuit of specific environmental and social objectives means that different
preferences will be expressed in different situations.

Isolated decisions disregard total

load, or the cumulative ecosystem impact produced by all human activity-past, present,
and future. The attempt to dictate results means that elements within the system are not

sometimes at multiple levels of government, as though ecosystems did not exist. If ecosystems
were protected, much of the attention now paid to other environmental and health concerns would
be unnecessary because they would not be in peril. Protected ecosystems would not contain
contaminants that cause environmental diseases. Separate legal regimes for the protection of
endangered species would be redundant because wildlife habitat would not shrink. No separate
forest management regime would be needed because forest ecosystems would be governed by the
general rule. The subjects of modem environmental law are elements of ecosystems. If ecosystems
were preserved, then ecosystem elements would be protected as well.
Pardy, supra n. 74, at 41 (footnote omitted).
78. Pardy, supra n. 76, at 675. Daniel Botkin states:
Having altered nature with our technology, we must depend on technology to see us through to
solutions. The task before us is to understand the biological world to the point that we can learn
how to live within the discordant harmonies of our biological surroundings, so that they function not
only to promote the continuation of life but also to benefit ourselves: our aesthetics, morality,
philosophies, and material needs.

Nature in the twenty-first century will be a nature that we make; the question is the degree to
which this molding will be intentional or unintentional, desirable or undesirable.
Daniel B. Botkin, Discordant Harmonies: A New Ecology for the Twenty-First Century 191, 193 (Oxford U.
Press 1990).
79. Ruhl, Pardy-Ruhl Dialogue, supra n. 8, at 28-29 (footnote omitted). For an in depth discussion of
ecosystem management see Oliver A. Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management, 81
Minn. L. Rev. 869 (1996).
80. Ruhl, Pardy-Ruhl Dialogue, supra n. 8, at 29 n. 17 (quoting Comm. on Mo. River Ecosystem Sci.,
Water Sci. & Tech. Bd., Div. on Earth & Life Stud., Natil. Research Council, The Missouri River Ecosystem:
Exploring the Prospects for Recovery 18-19 (Natl. Acad. Press 2002) (emphasis added) (available at
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record-id= 10277#toc)).
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autonomous nor engaged in a truly competitive pursuit of self-interest, the information
normally produced through system interactions is not accurate, the system's selfgoverning mechanisms are thrown off, the system's evolutionary destiny is altered, and
the ability of the system to function as a system is compromised.
C.

Law as a System

If law was to operate as a system, it would have features that resemble those of
ecosystems and markets. It would reflect their intrinsic neutrality and would consist of
general rules and principles that apply equally to all the participants within the systemdo not play
citizen and government, strong and weak, rich and poor.8 1 Systems
82
favorites. These rules and principles would be consistent and coherent.
Every insect eaten by a bird has meaning for the state of plants and animals in an
ecosystem; every sale of shoes has meaning for the state of commerce in a market; every
court judgment and administrative edict has meaning for the state of the law within its
jurisdiction. These decisions emanate from the system, not from the inclinations of the
individual decision-maker. Each decision is related to all others and to its rules and
principles-taking precedent seriously means that everything is connected to everything
else. The mandate of decision-makers is not to "do right," but instead to "let the system
speak."
Within a law of systems, as in ecosystems and markets, individuals are
autonomous and able to seek out their own self-interests. They are permitted to make
their own decisions and craft their own survival strategies based on the generally
applicable framework that the law provides, and they are allowed to succeed or fail on
the basis of those strategies. Statutes do not protect people (or market participants, or
ecosystem organisms) from themselves, and administrative and adjudicative decisionmakers do not modify the content of the law in accordance with the context of the case or
the personal circumstances of the parties. People have liberty to do as they wish unless

81.
The logic of mutual gain from voluntary exchange is perfectly general. It rests only on the selfinterest of individuals in a world of scarcity. It is not particular to one culture, one time, or one set
of values. Most important for these purposes, the logic of exchange is not role specific. It does not
speak about one set of rules for employers and another for employees, or one set for landlords and
another for tenants. It does not create one set of rules for people who are rich and powerful and
another set for those who are frail or meek.
Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World 73 (Harv. U. Press 1995).
82.
In a sensible legal system, the evolution of the law should make litigation less and less necessary
over time. If the law had been built up around broad, solid, comprehensible principles of justice
over hundreds of years, as we like to believe it was, then surely by now we should possess an
integrated system of principles that every member of society could readily grasp and use to guide
his or her conduct, even in a changing world.
There should be increasingly greater certainty about the principles a court would apply in
handling any conflict or grievance, and therefore less likelihood of the conflict ever finding its way
into a courtroom....
Instead, what we have experienced over the past few decades is exactly the opposite-an
explosion of litigation and a profusion of unclear, irreconcilable and swinging-pendulum case law.
Karen Selick, Legal Aid Underfunding Isn't the Problem, 26 Canadian Law. 54, 54 (June 2002).
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they cause others harm, 8 3 including distorting a market (such as by exercising monopoly
power) or corrupting an ecosystem (such as by causing permanent change to an
ecosystem's characteristics).
The jurisprudential theory that is most consistent with a conception of law as 8a4
system is perhaps Ronald Dworkin's notion of law as an interpretative enterprise.
According to Dworkin, within the law are principles sufficient to provide a correct
answer to any legal problem. 85 Like markets and ecosystems, law does not leave room
for vacuums.
How can the law command when the law books are silent or unclear or ambiguous?...
[L]egal reasoning is an exercise in constructive interpretation... [;] our law consists in the
... [;] it consists in the narrative story
best justification of our legal practices as a whole
86

that makes of these practices the best they can be.

Dworkin's conception of law is neither mechanistic, like formalism, nor
discretionary, like instrumentalism. Instead, it is an evolutionary, coherent whole with
internal integrity. "The adjudicative principle of integrity instructs judges to identify
legal rights and duties, so far as possible, on the assumption that they were all created by
a single author-the community personified-expressing a coherent conception of
justice and fairness." 87 This "single author" is internally consistent. Its principles apply
throughout. Each decision within this system relates to all of the others. 88 "Law as
integrity.., requires a judge to test his interpretation of any part of the great network of
whether it could form part
political structures and decisions of his community by asking
89
of a coherent theory justifying the network as a whole."
Within this framework, legal disputes consist of contests between rights-ights of
self-interested parties competing for the coercive help of the state-and the resolution of
these complaints is based upon principle, not policy.
Arguments of principle attempt to justify a political decision that benefits some person or
group by showing that the person or group has a right to the benefit. Arguments of policy
attempt to justify a decision by showing that, in spite of the fact that those who are
the benefit, providing the benefit will advance a collective
benefited do not have a right to 90
goal of the political community.
83.
breach
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

The major categories of which are physical or reputational harm to person or property (the law of torts),
of contract, and violation of another's property rights. See generally Epstein, supra n. 81.
See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Harv. U. Press 1986).
Arthur Ripstein, Introduction:Anti-Archimedeanism, in Ronald Dworkin, supra n. 23, at 3.
Dworkin, supran. 84, at vii.
Id. at 225.
Integrity does not require consistency in principle over all historical stages of a
community's law; it does not require that judges try to understand the law they enforce as
continuous in principle with the abandoned law of a previous century or even a previous
generation. It commands a horizontal rather than vertical consistency of principle across
the range of the legal standards the community now enforces. It insists that the law-the
rights and duties that flow from past collective decisions and for that reason license or
require coercion--contains not only the narrow explicit content of these decisions but
also, more broadly, the scheme of principles necessary to justify them.

Id. at 227.
89. Id. at 245.
90. Dworkin, supra n. 24, at 294.
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When legal outcomes are based upon rights, there is no room for the pursuit of
individualized justice or personal moral preference, which Dworkin rejects as
incompatible with the systemic nature of legal reasoning:
Law is also different from justice. Justice is a matter of the correct or best theory of
moral and political rights, and anyone's conception of justice is his theory, imposed by his
own personal convictions, of what these rights actually are. Law is a matter of which
supposed rights supply a justification for using or withholding the collective force 9of
1 the
state because they are included in or implied by actual political decisions of the past.
I have set out in Figure B below the basic differences that result when law is
approached as an instrumentalist exercise and when it is regarded as a dynamic system.

91.

Dworkin, supra n. 84, at 97.
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Figure B: Instrumentalism and Law as a System
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In a competitive market, no single player can determine price, supply, or demand.
In a proper legal system, no single official can determine a legal answer. The diversity
of functions between different branches of government, the separation of powers
between those functions, and the doctrine of precedent prevent any state actor from
deciding what should be done about any particular problem. Legislatures pass statutes
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that contain generally applicable rules and principles but must rely on administrative
officials for implementation and on courts for application to particular cases.
Administrative officials implement statutory directives, but only by the means of the
rules and principles that the statutes contain. Courts decide particular cases, but only
those particular cases brought to them by the executive branch or private parties, and
only in accordance with the rules and principles passed by the legislature and/or the rules
and principles articulated by previous courts. When law is a system, the powers of any
single official are extremely limited. The diversity of functions provides resilience and
stability. There are built-in self-regulating mechanisms-the appeal process, the
provision for judicial review of administrative action, and the ability of legislatures to
pass amendments to general rules in response to results reached by courts in particular
cases. Like markets and ecosystems, law is evolutionary. It can and does change, but
when operating as a system, it changes in a coherent and internally consistent manner.
V.

CONCLUSION

Law has less control over the world than it might appear. Ecosystems and markets
may be interfered with, but the nature of their processes cannot be altered. These
systems are not just collections of things. They consist of relationships and interactions
that express information and produce outcomes. They are organic and evolutionary,
changing through time. These systems have intelligence. The idea of dictating specific
ecological or economic results is inconsistent with the way they behave. The appropriate
role for law is to set generally applicable boundaries within which markets operate and to
establish generally applicable limits on the degree to which human actions encroach
upon ecosystems. Its proper mandate is to protect these systems from manipulation
rather than to seek to manipulate them.
Law is a system too. Its abstract features should resemble those of ecosystems and
markets: generally applicable rules and principles, intrinsic neutrality, internal coherence
and integrity, and autonomous individuals. The mandate of decision-makers is not to
"do right" but instead to "let the system speak." Instrumentalist legal decisions are made
as though they are isolated events, but they are not. They produce distorted information
and ignore the law of unintended consequences that applies when everything is attached
to everything else. Hard cases make bad law only when they are in the hands of an
instrumentalist decision-maker. Instrumentalism promotes adjudication that is contextdriven and therefore personal and arbitrary. It invites the unfettered exercise of state
power to pursue specific ends and the imposition of one group's priorities over others. It
erodes the rule of law and approaches the legal enterprise as though it is not a system.
Instrumentalism attempts to treat ecosystems and markets as though they are the simple
subjects of results-oriented legal commands, but they cannot be commanded in that way.
The hand is invisible, nature knows best, and justice is blind. Establish the general
conditions, and then let the systems run. Once generally applicable legal parameters are
established, the "right" result is what the system says it is. The right price is the price
dictated by competitive supply and demand. The right environmental conditions are
those produced by protected, unmanaged ecosystems. The right decision is that
prescribed by the generally applicable principles of a precedent-based system of law.
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